There is no such thing as a Signature-Based MAC. Being the wrong choice in the list, it is the best answer to this question.
WHAT IS A Message Authentication Code (MAC)?
In Cryptography, a MAC (Message Authentication Code) also known as a cryptographic
checksum, is a small block of data that is generated using a secret key and then appended
to the message. When the message is received, the recipient can generate their own MAC
using the secret key, and thereby know that the message has not changed either
accidentally or intentionally in transit. Of course, this assurance is only as strong as the
trust that the two parties have that no one else has access to the secret key.
A MAC is a small representation of a message and has the following characteristics:
A MAC is much smaller than the message generating it.
Given a MAC, it is impractical to compute the message that generated it.
Given a MAC and the message that generated it, it is impractical to find another message
generating the same MAC.
See the graphic below from Wikipedia showing the creation of a MAC value:

Message Authentication Code MAC HMAC In the example above, the sender of a message runs it through a MAC algorithm to produce a MAC data tag. The message and the MAC tag are then sent to the receiver. The receiver in turn runs the message portion of the transmission through the same MAC algorithm using the same key, producing a second MAC data tag. The receiver then compares the first MAC tag received in the transmission to the second generated MAC tag. If they are identical, the receiver can safely assume that the integrity of the message was not compromised, and the message was not altered or tampered with during transmission.
However, to allow the receiver to be able to detect replay attacks, the message itself must contain data that assures that this same message can only be sent once (e.g. time stamp, sequence number or use of a one-time MAC). Otherwise an attacker could – without even understanding its content – record this message and play it back at a later time, producing the same result as the original sender. NOTE: There are many ways of producing a MAC value. Below you have a short list of some implementation.
The following were incorrect answers for this question:
They were all incorrect answers because they are all real type of MAC implementation. In the case of DES-CBC, a MAC is generated using the DES algorithm in CBC mode, and the secret DES key is shared by the sender and the receiver. The MAC is actually just the last block of ciphertext generated by the algorithm. This block of data (64 bits) is attached to the unencrypted message and transmitted to the far end. All previous blocks of encrypted data are discarded to prevent any attack on the MAC itself. The receiver can just generate his own MAC using the secret DES key he shares to ensure message integrity and authentication. He knows that the message has not changed because the chaining function of CBC would significantly alter the last block of data if any bit had changed anywhere in the message. He knows the source of the message (authentication) because only one other person holds the secret key.
A Keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) is a specific construction for calculating a message authentication code (MAC) involving a cryptographic hash function in combination with a secret cryptographic key. As with any MAC, it may be used to simultaneously verify both the data integrity and the authentication of a message. Any cryptographic hash function, such as MD5, SHA-1, may be used in the calculation of an HMAC; the resulting MAC algorithm is termed HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1 accordingly. The cryptographic strength of the HMAC depends upon the cryptographic strength of the underlying hash function, the size of its hash output, and on the size and quality of the key.
A message authentication code based on universal hashing, or UMAC, is a type of message authentication code (MAC) calculated choosing a hash function from a class of hash functions according to some secret (random) process and applying it to the message. The resulting digest or fingerprint is then encrypted to hide the identity of the hash function used. As with any MAC, it may be used to simultaneously verify both the data integrity and the authenticity of a message. UMAC is specified in RFC 4418, it has provable cryptographic strength and is usually a lot less computationally intensive than other MACs.
What is the MicMac (confusion) with MIC and MAC?
The term message integrity code (MIC) is frequently substituted for the term MAC, especially in communications, where the acronym MAC traditionally stands for Media Access Control when referring to Networking. However, some authors use MIC as a distinctly different term from a MAC; in their usage of the term the MIC operation does not use secret keys. This lack of security means that any MIC intended for use gauging message integrity should be encrypted or otherwise be protected against tampering. MIC algorithms are created such that a given message will always produce the same MIC assuming the same algorithm is used to generate both. Conversely, MAC algorithms are designed to produce matching MACs only if the same message, secret key and initialization vector are input to the same algorithm. MICs do not use secret keys and, when taken on their own, are therefore a much less reliable gauge of message integrity than MACs. Because MACs use secret keys, they do not necessarily need to be encrypted to provide the same level of assurance.
Reference(s) used for this question:
Hernandez CISSP, Steven (2012-12-21). Official (ISC)2 Guide to the CISSP CBK, Third Edition ((ISC)2 Press) (Kindle Locations 15799-15815). Auerbach Publications. Kindle Edition. and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_authentication_code and http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4418

Section: Security Operation Adimnistration
Explanation/Reference:
Configuration management isn’t about preventing change but ensuring the integrity of IT resources by preventing unauthorised or improper changes.
According to the Official ISC2 guide to the CISSP exam, a good CM process is one that can:
(1) accommodate change;
(2) accommodate the reuse of proven standards and best practices;
(3) ensure that all requirements remain clear, concise, and valid;
(4) ensure changes, standards, and requirements are communicated promptly and precisely; and (5) ensure that the results conform to each instance of the product.
Configuration management
Configuration management (CM) is the detailed recording and updating of information that describes an enterprise’s computer systems and networks, including all hardware and software components. Such information typically includes the versions and updates that have been applied to installed software packages and the locations and network addresses of hardware devices. Special configuration management software is available. When a system needs a hardware or software upgrade, a computer technician can accesses the configuration management program and database to see what is currently installed. The technician can then make a more informed decision about the upgrade needed.
An advantage of a configuration management application is that the entire collection of systems can be reviewed to make sure any changes made to one system do not adversely affect any of the other systems Configuration management is also used in software development, where it is called Unified Configuration Management (UCM). Using UCM, developers can keep track of the source code, documentation, problems, changes requested, and changes made.
Change management
In a computer system environment, change management refers to a systematic approach to keeping track of the details of the system (for example, what operating system release is running on each computer and which fixes have been applied).

Section: Access Control
Explanation
Explanation/Reference:
The Key Distribution Center (KDC) holds all users’ and services’ cryptographic keys. It provides authentication services, as well as key distribution functionality. The Authentication Service is the part of the KDC that authenticates a principal. The Key Distribution Service and Key Granting Service are distracters and are not defined Kerberos components.
Source: WALLHOFF, John, CISSP Summary 2002, April 2002, CBK#1 Access Control System & Methodology (page 3)

Explanation/Reference:
UDP is a scaled-down version of TCP. It is used like TCP, but only offers a “best effort” delivery. It is connectionless, does not offer error correction, does not sequence the packet segments, and less reliable than TCP but because of its lower overhead, it provides a faster transmission than TCP.
Source: KRUTZ, Ronald L. & VINES, Russel D., The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the Ten Domains of Computer Security, John Wiley & Sons, 2001, Chapter 3: Telecommunications and Network Security (page
86).

Section: Risk, Response and Recovery
Explanation/Reference:
A cold site is a permanent location that provide you with your own space that you can move into in case of a disaster or catastrophe. It is one of the cheapest solution available as a rental place but it is also the one that would take the most time to recover. A cold site usually takes one to two weeks for recoverey.
Although major disruptions with long-term effects may be rare, they should be accounted for in the contingency plan. The plan should include a trategy to recover and perform system operations at an alternate facility for an extended period. In general, three types of alternate sites are available:
Dedicated site owned or operated by the organization. Also called redundant or alternate sites; Reciprocal agreement or memorandum of agreement with an internal or external entity; and Commercially leased facility.
Regardless of the type of alternate site chosen, the facility must be able to support system operations as defined in the contingency plan. The three alternate site types commonly categorized in terms of their operational readiness are cold sites, warm sites, or hot sites. Other variations or combinations of these can be found, but generally all variations retain similar core features found in one of these three site types.
Progressing from basic to advanced, the sites are described below:
Cold Sites are typically facilities with adequate space and infrastructure (electric power, telecommunications connections, and environmental controls) to support information system recovery activities.
ƒWarm Sites are partially equipped office spaces that contain some or all of the system hardware, software, telecommunications, and power sources.
Hot Sites are facilities appropriately sized to support system requirements and configured with the necessary system hardware, supporting infrastructure, and support personnel.
As discussed above, these three alternate site types are the most common. There are also variations, and hybrid mixtures of features from any one of the three. Each organization should evaluate its core requirements in order to establish the most effective solution.
Two examples of variations to the site types are:
ƒMobile Sites are self-contained, transportable shells custom-fitted with specific telecommunications and system equipment necessary to meet system requirements.
ƒMirrored Sites are fully redundant facilities with automated real-time information mirroring. Mirrored sites are identical to the primary site in all technical respects.
There are obvious cost and ready-time differences among the options. In these examples, the mirrored site is the most expensive choice, but it ensures virtually 100 percent availability. Cold sites are the least expensive to maintain, although they may require substantial time to acquire and install necessary equipment. Partially equipped sites, such as warm sites, fall in the middle of the spectrum. In many cases, mobile sites may be delivered to the desired location within 24 hours, but the time necessary for equipment installation and setup can increase this response time. The selection of fixed-site locations should account for the time and mode of transportation necessary to move personnel and/or equipment there. In addition, the fixed site should be in a geographic area that is unlikely to be negatively affected by the same hazard as the organization’s primary site.
The following reference(s) were used for this question:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-34-rev1/sp800-34-rev1_errata-Nov11-2010.pdf

Section: Network and Telecommunications
Explanation/Reference:
While neither CBK nor AIO3 use the term “screening router,” they both discuss how the packet filtering capabilities of a router can be used to block traffic much like a packet filtering firewall. Krutz and Vine use this term on p. 90.
“A scanning router” is incorrect. This is a nonsense term to distract you.
“A shielding router” is incorrect. This is a nonsense term to distract you.
“A sniffing router” is incorrect. This is a nonsense term to distract you.
References:
CBK, p. 433
AIO3, pp.484 – 485

Normal outbound traffic has an internal source IP address and an external destination IP address.
Traffic with an internal source IP address should only come from an internal interface. Such packets coming from an external interface should be dropped.
Packets with the source-routing option enabled usually indicates a network intrusion attempt.
Router information exchange protocols like RIP and OSPF should be dropped to avoid having internal routing equipment being reconfigured by external agents.
Source: STREBE, Matthew and PERKINS, Charles, Firewalls 24seven, Sybex 2000, Chapter 10: The Perfect Firewall.

Section: Security Operation Adimnistration
Explanation/Reference:
The Answer: “acceptance phase”. Note the question asks about an “evaluation report” – which details how the system evaluated, and an “accreditation statement” which describes the level the system is allowed to operate at. Because those two activities are a part of testing and testing is a part of the acceptance phase, the only answer above that can be correct is “acceptance phase”.
The other answers are not correct because:
The “project initiation and planning phase” is just the idea phase. Nothing has been developed yet to be evaluated, tested, accredited, etc.
The “system design specification phase” is essentially where the initiation and planning phase is fleshed out.
For example, in the initiation and planning phase, we might decide we want the system to have authentication.
In the design specification phase, we decide that that authentication will be accomplished via username/ password. But there is still nothing actually developed at this point to evaluate or accredit.
The “development & documentation phase” is where the system is created and documented. Part of the documentation includes specific evaluation and accreditation criteria. That is the criteria that will be used to evaluate and accredit the system during the “acceptance phase”.
In other words – you cannot evaluate or accredit a system that has not been created yet. Of the four answers listed, only the acceptance phase is dealing with an existing system. The others deal with planning and creating the system, but the actual system isn’t there yet.
Reference:
Official ISC2 Guide Page: 558 – 559
All in One Third Edition page: 832 – 833 (recommended reading)

Once the merchant server has been authenticated by the browser client, the browser generates a master secret that is to be shared only between the server and client. This secret serves as a seed to generate the session (private) keys. The master secret is then encrypted with the merchant’s public key and sent to the server. The fact that the master secret is generated by the client’s browser provides the client assurance that the server is not reusing keys that would have been used in a previous session with another client.
Source: ANDRESS, Mandy, Exam Cram CISSP, Coriolis, 2001, Chapter 6: Cryptography
(page 112).
Also: HARRIS, Shon, All-In-One CISSP Certification Exam Guide, McGraw-Hill/Osborne,
2001, page 569.

Explanation/Reference:
Since all the secret keys are held and authentication is performed on the Kerberos TGS and the authentication servers, these servers are vulnerable to both physical attacks and attacks from malicious code.
Because a client’s password is used in the initiation of the Kerberos request for the service protocol, password guessing can be used to impersonate a client.
Source: KRUTZ, Ronald L. & VINES, Russel D., The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the Ten Domains of Computer Security, 2001, John Wiley & Sons, Page 42.

Section: Security Operation Adimnistration
Explanation/Reference:
Ensuring that the user alone does not have sufficient rights to subvert an important process is a concern of the separation of duties principle and it does not concern the least privilege principle.
Source: DUPUIS, Clément, Access Control Systems and Methodology CISSP Open Study Guide, version 1.0, march 2002 (page 33).

Section: Analysis and Monitoring
Explanation/Reference:
The two most common implementations of Intrusion Detection are Network-based and Host-based.
IDS can be implemented as a network device, such as a router, switch, firewall, or dedicated device monitoring traffic, typically referred to as network IDS (NIDS).
The” (IDS) “technology can also be incorporated into a host system (HIDS) to monitor a single system for undesirable activities. ” A network intrusion detection system (NIDS) is a network device …. that monitors traffic traversing the network segment for which it is integrated.” Remember that NIDS are usually passive in nature.
HIDS is the implementation of IDS capabilities at the host level. Its most significant difference from NIDS is that related processes are limited to the boundaries of a single-host system. However, this presents advantages in effectively detecting objectionable activities because the IDS process is running directly on the host system, not just observing it from the network.
Reference(s) used for this question:
Hernandez CISSP, Steven (2012-12-21). Official (ISC)2 Guide to the CISSP CBK, Third Edition ((ISC)2 Press) (Kindle Locations 3649-3652). Auerbach Publications. Kindle Edition.

Explanation/Reference:
From the glossary of Computer Security Basics:
The Bell-LaPadula model is the security policy model on which the Orange Book requirements are based.
From the Orange Book definition, “A formal state transition model of computer security policy that describes a set of access control rules. In this formal model, the entities in a computer system are divided into abstract sets of subjects and objects. The notion of secure state is defined and it is proven that each state transition preserves security by moving from secure state to secure state; thus, inductively proving the system is secure. A system state is defined to be ‘secure’ if the only permitted access modes of subjects to objects are in accordance with a specific security policy. In order to determine whether or not a specific access mode is allowed, the clearance of a subject is compared to the classification of the object and a determination is made as to whether the subject is authorized for the specific access mode.” The Biba Model is an integrity model of computer security policy that describes a set of rules. In this model, a subject may not depend on any object or other subject that is less trusted than itself.
The Clark Wilson Model is an integrity model for computer security policy designed for a commercial environment. It addresses such concepts as nondiscretionary access control, privilege separation, and least privilege. TEMPEST is a government program that prevents the compromising electrical and electromagnetic signals that emanate from computers and related equipment from being intercepted and deciphered.
Source: RUSSEL, Deborah & GANGEMI, G.T. Sr., Computer Security Basics, O’Reilly, 1991.
Also: U.S. Department of Defense, Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (Orange Book), DOD
5200.28-STD. December 1985 (also available here).

The use of discriminating judgment, a guard can make the
determinations that hardware or other automated security devices cannot make due to its
ability to adjust to rapidly changing conditions, to learn and alter recognizable patterns, and
to respond to various conditions in the environment. Guards are better at making value
decisions at times of incidents. They are appropriate whenever immediate, discriminating
judgment is required by the security entity.
The following answers are incorrect:
The use of physical force This is not the best answer. A guard provides discriminating
judgment, and the ability to discern the need for physical force.
The operation of access control devices A guard is often uninvolved in the operations of an
automated access control device such as a biometric reader, a smart lock, mantrap, etc.
The need to detect unauthorized access The primary function of a guard is not to detect
unauthorized access, but to prevent unauthorized physical access attempts and may deter
social engineering attempts.
The following reference(s) were/was used to create this question:
Source: KRUTZ, Ronald L. & VINES, Russel D., The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the
Ten Domains of Computer Security, John Wiley & Sons, 2001, Chapter 10: Physical
security (page 339).
Source: ISC2 Offical Guide to the CBK page 288-289.

Confidentiality is the opposite of disclosure.
Source: KRUTZ, Ronald L. & VINES, Russel D., The CISSP Prep Guide: Mastering the Ten Domains of Computer Security, 2001, John Wiley & Sons, Page 59.